



SEMINAR REPORT

UNITAR Peace and Security Series: Preventing Genocide

2-3 April 2007
United Nations Headquarters, New York

BACKGROUND

On 2-3 April 2007, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) hosted a seminar on “Preventing Genocide” as part of the Peace and Security Series.

The event was held in Conference rooms 1 and 4 at United Nations (UN) Headquarters.

The attendees included 58 delegates from Permanent Missions, 23 staff from UN Secretariat, agencies and other international organizations; and 27 participants from civil society organizations.

OBJECTIVES

The seminar was intended to foster a better understanding of the legal concept of genocide, and the dynamics leading to and driving genocidal violence; the role and areas of intervention of structural prevention; the existing UN tools and mechanisms for operational prevention, and how these can be strengthened specifically with regard to the prevention of genocide; the importance of education and training for genocide prevention; the roles and contributions of different actors, including civil society, and how coordination and cooperation among them can be strengthened.

Information on the seminar and the Peace and Security Series is available from info@unitary.org or at <http://www.unitary.org/en/peacesecseries.html>



SUMMARY OF INTERVENTIONS

During this seminar, it was highlighted that genocide prevention is a question of generating political will and building the capacity of governments and other stakeholders to implement and enforce existing legal and normative principles and mechanisms. Genocide prevention requires a proactive approach – from the active search for information and the effort to understand dynamics of genocide to the development and use of effective instruments to prevent and stop genocidal violence.

UNDERSTANDING GENOCIDE

Genocide is a product of human intentionality. It requires motivation, capacity and a conducive environment. It involves both active and passive agency, by those who perpetrate it, and those who let it happen. Speakers cautioned not to confound conflict prevention and genocide prevention. While, oftentimes, genocide happens in the context of war and violent conflict, the intent and dynamics of genocide are distinct. As Dr. Stanton pointed out, there was no conflict between Germans and Jews prior to the Holocaust. Genocide is a unilateral aggression. Still, it seems that existing diplomatic and military tools for operational prevention are first and foremost geared towards interfering in conflicts between two or more parties.

Dr. Gregory Stanton provided an analytical framework for understanding genocidal processes, which describes their unfolding in eight stages and identifies potential interventions at different points in time:

1) *Classification*, the “us versus them” stage. Classification by nationality, ethnicity, race or religion is a primary method of dividing society and creating a power struggle between groups. 2) *Symbolization*, the labeling of groups, and imposition of certain types of dress, uniforms, colours or symbols. 3) *Dehumanization* of one group by another group, justifying and preparing its victimization. This happens through the use of denigrating language and is reflected in euphemisms like “ethnic cleansing” and “purification”. 4) *Organization*. Genocide is neither an individual, nor a spontaneous crime, but the act of an organized group. 5) *Polarization* of the society: Extremists fuel an antagonism of groups by silencing, threatening, intimidating, or even killing political moderates, given that they are most likely to be able to prevent genocide. Attacks are staged and blamed on the targeted group. 6) *Preparation*, as indicated by the maintenance of death lists and the stockpiling of weapons. Prospective victims are forced to wear identifying symbols; they are separated, segregated, sometimes deported to famine struck regions. 7) *Extermination* framed as “purification” and often underpinned by utopian visions of a perfect society. Dr. Andrea Bartoli pointed out that genocide typically involves a self-protective ideology of existential adversity („if they exist we don’t“). The elimination of the other is perceived as a duty. 8) *Denial* occurs both during and after the genocide extending its legacy to future generations. There are several strategies of denial: question or destroy the evidence and attack the truth-tellers; deny genocidal intent, claiming that deaths were inadvertent or the result of conflict; argue that crimes do not match the legal definition of genocide and “only” constitute crimes against humanity or “ethnic cleansing”. Dr. Stanton mentioned that the burden of proof must be shifted to those who deny the occurrence of genocide. He also warned that denial does not only come from perpetrators, but also from the diplomatic community in its concern not to upset peace processes.

Part of the seminar’s discussions touched upon questions regarding the extent to which the attention and efforts of the international community should be specifically focused on genocide and the prevention thereof. Participants warned that clinging to the “g-word” could stall action in the absence of consensus about the recognition of a situation as genocide. Some advocated that atrocities in general, be they crimes against humanity or war crimes must be prevented and on the radar of any prevention mechanism.



A CULTURE OF PREVENTION

Following the report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the seminar distinguished between structural and operational elements of prevention. Among the structural conditions conducive to the prevention of violent conflict and mass crime are respect for human rights and the promotion of the wellbeing, development and participation of all individuals and communities. Societies need non-violent mechanisms to address conflicts and grievances. Strengthening the rule of law is a key element in this regard. The importance of education and public debate and, in this context, the role of the media was highlighted, indicating that a culture of prevention is a culture that provides space for self-reflective practices both at the international and the national levels.

Structural Prevention

“We need to link the responsibility to protect less to the question of international intervention and more to endogenous processes of societal transformation in each country.”
Dr. Andrea Bartoli

Dr. David Hamburg outlined six pillars that are crucial for the prevention not only of genocide, but of all kinds of mass crime. These include operational elements, such as 1) the continuous flow of accurate information on emerging conflicts and early warning; 2) the ready availability and proactive use of preventive diplomacy; and 3) serious restraints on weaponry and effective arms control regimes. He then elaborated on the structural pillars, namely 4) the need to foster democracy; 5) equitable socioeconomic development; and 6) peace education, stating: *“Patiently constructed democracies, based on fair processes of mutual accommodation, offer the best chance for non-violent conflict resolution.”* Democracies are most likely to protect human rights and to develop ongoing mechanisms for settling disagreements, an essential precondition for pluralism and mutual respect. Established democracies should share their experience with emerging, fragile democracies and offer tangible help. A good example is provided by the European Union’s accession policy. Dr. Hamburg stressed that habits of understanding others and working out compromises are *learned*. From primary education to the education of political leaders, curricula should be designed to facilitate constructive social engagement and peaceful coexistence. Investment in the knowledge, skills, health, and freedom of people holds the key to equitable socio-economic development.

One instrument of guaranteeing respect for pluralism is the protection of **minority rights**. Minorities and marginalized groups are likely to become the targets of genocide and other human rights violations. Special attention should therefore be given to their situation. There are three types of minority rights: rights pertaining to the protection of identity (language, culture, maintenance and development of community across generations, diversity management); rights guaranteeing economic and social wellbeing (e.g. through guaranteed access to resources and employment); and rights linked to participation (allowing minorities to protect their interests and to participate in all issues of public interest not just those directly affecting their own group). While modest international standards exist, there is a lack of implementation and tangible effect even in democratic societies. Minority rights need to be further specified and effective implementation schemes should be developed at the international level. More resources must be allocated to monitoring and preventive mechanisms, such as the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner for the Protection of Minority Rights.

Where the prevention of victimization failed, mechanism such as **Truth and Reconciliation Commissions** may contribute to prevent future human rights abuses, by giving victims the chance to tell their stories and voice their grievances, thereby reducing their sense of victimization and the need for revenge. In addition to evidence collected and the diffusion of knowledge, there needs to be acknowledgment of the fact that what happened was wrong, especially when atrocities were committed under the guise of “noble causes”. While Truth Commissions provide a platform for multiple accounts of “the truth”, they still “limit the scope of lies that can be told”, and make denial more difficult. There is a global trend that truth leads to justice and reparations. Rather than a trade off, there seems to be an interlinkage, with more knowledge about gross violations of human rights leading to a greater need for accountability. Truth Commissions can therefore less easily be used as a cover-up for States that do not



acknowledge past mass crimes.

Dr. Andrea Bartoli posited that countries that went through genocide or experienced war and massive human rights violations actually want to come back on these traumas. States should have the possibility to allow the legacy of violence in their country.

Truth Commissions can be a motor of endogenous processes of transformation, because they provide a diagnosis of how a country was able to slip into atrocities and what the role of the State was in this regard. They can, therefore, open up possibilities for structural changes. Their transformative impact on society is likely to be greatest, if Commissions can spur a national conversation about the past. As Paul van Zyl underlined, *“the recognition of the past must not be a purely legal and institutional exercise or academic endeavor, but rather a part of popular culture.”* The media has a crucial role to play in this regard.

Three forms of interventions can help **media** permeate popular culture with positive messages: 1) Structural interventions, including support for independent media, media diversity and ownership, and the strengthening of laws regulating the media; 2) aggressive interventions, e.g. radio and TV jamming; 3) content interventions, promoting a culture of prevention by sending messages of tolerance, empathy and cooperation. During the seminar Ms. Susan Koscis presented examples of media projects contributing to reconciliation and the diffusion of inter-ethnic tensions. These included a radio show in Liberia that is co-hosted by former child soldiers from different camps, a TV series in Nigeria, featuring inter-ethnic reporter teams covering the national news, and the recording of peace songs with popular stars in Angola and Israel/Palestine.

It was cautioned, however, that the media can also be an instrument of incitement to hatred, violence and ultimately genocide. Ms. Simone Monasebian, a former prosecutor in the media trials before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda observed *“Today’s wars are not fought with bullets only, but also with words, newspapers and radio stations.”* The active role of certain radio stations in the Rwandan genocide has led to a heightened awareness for the need to monitor media for hate speech and incitement to violence, as also reflected in Security Council resolution 1572 on Cote d’Ivoire.

As is the case with media, the conduct of the **business sector** – from multinational companies to the informal sector – can both fuel and mitigate conflict. Increasingly aware of the costs associated with conflicts, the private sector has engaged in some standard setting initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, and the Extractive Industry Voluntary Initiative, which provide guidelines on financial relations with host governments, relations with armed actors, and relations with host communities. However, there are no enforcement mechanisms in case of non-compliance. The UN has appointed a Special Representative for Business and Human Rights to “map evolving standards, practices, gaps and trends”. A lack of clarity on the accountability of the private sector under international humanitarian and human rights law exists, though recently first cases have been brought against businesses for complicity in human rights violations before Dutch courts. Compliance with national laws and regulations is oftentimes not enough to prevent businesses from doing harm. Proactive, conflict-sensitive business practices are needed based on proper conflict analysis and engagement with stakeholders on the ground to identify two-way risks and mitigating steps. Ideally, businesses may add positive value to peacebuilding processes and the prevention of future violence by creating employment, operating across conflict divides and encouraging reconciliation in the workplace.

LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

*“Genocide is no longer to be abolished. It has been abolished in principle.
It is only the implementation that is lagging behind.”
Dr. Andrea Bartoli*



The international community still lacks clarity on the exact content of the international legal obligation to prevent genocide. **The Genocide Convention**, which defines the crime of genocide and was adopted in 1948, does not provide for a treaty body or any periodic reporting by States Parties on the implementation of their obligations. In addition, it was mentioned that the Convention's overall focus is more on punishment than on prevention. A source of clarification could arise from the recent judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on, *Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro*, which established that the obligation to prevent genocide is one of conduct and not of result. The State has to employ all available means without the obligation to actually succeed. It would be responsible where it manifestly fails to take all measures within its power that might contribute to preventing genocide. However, the State can only be held responsible for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide in the event that it actually occurs.

Speakers expressed the hope that further clarification on the obligation to prevent genocide will arise from the ongoing discussion on the operationalization of **the Responsibility to Protect (RtP)**.

It was stressed that the endorsement of the RtP principle in the 2005 World Summit outcome document marked a major breakthrough. By reframing state sovereignty in terms of responsibility, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that shaped this terminology in its final report released in 2001, managed to situate the discussion from the right of the intervening actor to the right of the civilians to be protected. It was underlined that the RtP is a new norm of qualified sovereignty, but is still based on a pro-sovereignty agenda. While it was observed that there is enormous cross-regional consensus on the principle of the RtP, the challenge is to turn this principle into policy tools, since no State has fleshed out policy for implementing the RtP, yet.

As Ms. Heidi Hulan explained, the World Summit outcome document qualified the ICISS report in that it expects the international community to intervene and protect only in cases of *manifest failure* of the State to do so. Thus, the Security Council (SC) does not have to judge the intentions of the State concerned, but can base its discussions on evidence, which may contribute to greater transparency in the Council. The Summit language is also quite specific about the cases in which the SC has the responsibility to act, namely crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide.

While the responsibility to protect re-articulates the responsibility of states and the international community, **the principle of protection of civilians**, especially during armed conflict, is one of the normative foundations of the international community. It is enshrined in most national legislations and the UN Charter, as well as the Geneva Conventions and the Statute of the ICC. Beyond a legal obligation, the protection of civilians is a comprehensive umbrella concept, first set forth by the Secretary-General in 1997, embracing all activities that afford civilians a higher measure of physical and legal protection, including humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and justice. As Mr. Hansjoerg Strohmeyer put it "*It's not prevention or nothing, but about avoiding the exacerbation of suffering during conflicts.*" The Security Council endorsed the concept of protection of civilians in armed conflicts in the resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1347 (2006). It was also stressed, however, that most activities to protect civilians do not require a Security Council resolution.

The responsibility to prevent and to protect remains first and foremost with States, who should develop national prevention systems. If States cannot deliver on their responsibility, international assistance should be the second step. Only if a State does not accept assistance, the responsibility of the international community comes into play. Security Council action stands at the end of the process, and not at the beginning.

Indeed, it was mentioned that the international prevention architecture itself still has a lot of unrealized potential. In this regard, speakers were rather skeptical about the political organs of the UN, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the reformed Human Rights Council taking a lead role in the prevention of genocide.



While the General Assembly has issued statements which empower the Secretary-General to get involved in prevention, to date, Member States have not committed to the cause of genocide prevention through a formal resolution or declaration. However, the General Assembly has an important role to play in norm-building and strengthening the consensus on this issue. It was recommended that lobbying efforts should be undertaken to obtain a General Assembly declaration on the prevention of genocide.

OPERATIONAL PREVENTION: ACTORS AND TOOLS

The second part of the seminar discussed elements of operational prevention, focusing mainly on the capacities of the international community. Speakers stressed the need to move from passive monitoring to an active pull of information, and to assign responsibility to reach out and find information. Dedicated institutions should be established at the national and international levels to reduce the transaction costs by the time action is required. It was also highlighted that “presence is prevention”, an argument for the preventive deployment of human rights and humanitarian field officers, as well as military troops. In addition, expanded and intensified talks and relations between governments and non-governmental actors are likely to increase the effectiveness and acceptance of preventive measures.

Early Warning

*„Effective prevention is facilitated by ample warning time.
Warning time is typically not weeks or even months, but actually years.”
Dr. David Hamburg*

The discussion about early warning mechanisms reflected on how information, knowledge and action can be linked better. Most speakers agreed that there is no lack of information. Technological development allows for immediate availability of information worldwide and accessibility of even the most remote areas through satellite systems. Apart from media coverage and the internet, which provide information of human rights violations, there are a number of actors within the UN system that gather such evidence, including Special Rapporteurs and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who have the capacity to bring the attention of the international community to a situation. In 2004, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the first Special Advisor (SA) on the Prevention of Genocide, whose mandate is to provide early-warning and proposals for early-action to the UN Secretary-General and through him to the Security Council. However, the outgoing Special Adviser, Mr. Juan Mendez, whose term expired at the end of March 2007, mentioned that, due to the reluctance of Member States, there is no agreed set of indicators for early warning on conflict and genocide within the UN Secretariat. Also, while several UN agencies like OHCHR, UNHCR and ILO collect information that could be used for early warning purposes none of these organizations undertakes comprehensive risk assessments and analysis.

A first challenge, therefore, consists in pooling information and transforming it into knowledge. Knowledge is based on a good analysis and contextualization of information. This requires following situations over time and relying on local resources.

It was suggested that desk officers in DPA’s regional divisions should have good knowledge of the countries that they monitor, as well as the means to travel and engage with people directly. They should also be tasked with doing regular risk assessments.

Initiatives at the regional and sub-regional level provide good examples in this regard. The OSCE High Commissioner for the Protection of National Minorities links information gathering, analysis and pro-active engagement with the potential conflict parties during visits and direct talks in the country in crisis. Another good practice is the CEWARN early warning system established by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), an organization of seven countries at the Horn of Africa. Thanks to its multi-stakeholder approach, relying on field representatives and local committees, and the engagement of civil society organizations and academic institutions in the information gathering, analysis and formulation of



response options, the mechanism contributes to confidence-building between governments, civil society and local actors. This bottom-up approach is likely to produce more field-appropriate responses and provides authorities with greater legitimacy to take action. However, while the system has developed a solid understanding of sub-regional conflict patterns, including correlations with natural disasters, which allows governments to intervene proactively, Ambassador Abdelrahim Khalid, who spoke on behalf of CEWARN, mentioned that the response capacity of the system is still underdeveloped.

The quest for better analysis should not supplant or prevent the passage to action. A lot is already known about causes of conflict and also about solutions. *We do not need perfect knowledge to act.* Action requires a comparison of risks and calculation of the chances for success. It also requires a great deal of judgment. Sending up information that hints at genocide is not an easy task in most administrations, including the UN, because of the enormous responsibility involved.

Early Action: Preventive Diplomacy

"Ideas must travel with diplomacy, and diplomacy must travel with ideas."
Dr. Bertrand Ramcharan

Mr. John Packer posited that, like an insurance company that gives out fire extinguishers to its clients to minimize its own risk, the international community should take a proactive approach to prevention.

The costs are much lower and the chances of success much higher at an early stage of intervention. Investment in prevention is less expensive and more effective in terms of peace and security outcomes than interventions at a later stage.

For example, it was mentioned that the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was able to raise 4 million US dollars in voluntary contributions from Member States for mediation and prevention, while 18 billion dollars have been spent for peacekeeping in the last 5 years.

With regard to early action, speakers saw the Secretary-General (SG) having the lead role within the UN system. Dr. Bertrand Ramcharan gave a historical overview of how each SG has interpreted this role and strengthened the UN's preventive capacity. Milestones in this regard were Dag Hammarskjöld's idea to have a ring of Special Representatives around the world; the establishment of the UN disaster relief office, (today the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA) by U Thant; the use of discrete fact-finding missions in Bulgaria and South Africa under Peres de Cuellar; and the creation of six regional divisions (today four) within the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) under Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Dr. David Hamburg stressed the potential of the UN programmes, funds and agencies to function as a global network for prevention. The humanitarian community through its mere presence often provides some degree of protection in zones of war and conflict. Humanitarian actors also engage in negotiations with conflicting parties to gain access to populations at risk. These initiatives should be linked to political peace mediation efforts.

It is important to strengthen the UN's capacity in the field of peacemaking, preventive diplomacy and mediation through training and the sharing of lessons learned, especially by tapping into the knowledge and experience of the Special Representatives and Envoys of the SG. However, it was also mentioned that the decision to engage in preventive diplomacy and offer good offices is always a discretionary act on the part of the Secretary-General that depends on whether the parties concerned are receptive of the initiative.



Raising the Stakes for Genocidaires: the “Sticks” of the International Community

The implementation of the responsibility to protect agenda has a large deterrence potential, depending on the willingness of the Security Council to act. On the normative side, some advancement has already been made, with Security Council mandates today, e.g. for Darfur being much more robust and comprehensive than the mandate given to the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) at the time of the genocide. However, differences among the five Permanent Members are likely to stall the Council's capacity to act, especially when it comes to taking measures under Chapter VII of the Charter against the will of the State concerned. It was suggested that the Permanent Five should abstain from using their veto power in cases falling under the responsibility to protect, especially genocide.

The use of coercive tools, such as **sanctions** will only be an effective means of prevention, making targets come to the bargaining table, if there is a unity of purpose of the imposing States. The Security Council has used sanctions with a view to preventing large-scale violence and human rights abuses: Resolution 1572 on Cote d'Ivoire demands that all media and broadcast diffusing hate speech be stopped and imposes travel bans and asset freezes on all those who incite to hatred and violence and impede the peace process. Likewise, resolution 1591 on the situation in Sudan threatens with travel bans and asset freezes all those impeding the peace process. However, the success of sanctions does not only depend on unified political will, but also on the capacity of the monitoring regime that enforces them. This is why the Security Council has set up expert panels for each situation.

Intervening while there is still a peace to keep is probably the most effective way to prevent mass violence. **The preventive deployment of troops** can enhance the chances for a political solution in situations of imminent violence. However, it cannot substitute for a political process. Ms. Jane Holl Lute cautioned that in the context of the massive surge in UN peacekeeping operations in recent years (over the last four years 10 new missions have been deployed), gaining support for a preventive deployment is not an easy task, all the more since it requires Member States to incur political costs today, to prevent something from happening tomorrow. She outlined some of the principles for successful deployment, including: a clear mandate; consent of the parties; a viable mechanism for dialogue; a credible troop size; unity of command; clear guidance on the use of force; and enough financial support. Capabilities matter, especially intelligence capacity to understand the tactical environment and combat power to deter spoilers. When adequately equipped and part of a package of measures, a preventive deployment mission can be an effective deterrent, serve as a cross-party mechanism and provide the “eyes and ears” of the international community on the ground. However, there are external challenges for UN peace operations, such as rampant lawlessness in many arenas of deployment, and internal challenges, including the lack of a standing military force, of a body of doctrine, and of a standing strategic planning unit within the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). There is a need for training to move from transplanting experiences from one situation to the next to the development of expertise.

In the two most prominent cases of failure to prevent genocide after the end of the Cold War, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, set up **the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR)** with the mandate to punish perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Tribunals handed down the first convictions for genocide in the history of international criminal justice (the concept of genocide did not exist at the time of the Nuremberg trials after World War II), sending a deterring message to other potential perpetrators. However, the scope of the Tribunals is limited, and their work is due to end in 2010.

With the creation of **the International Criminal Court (ICC)** a permanent and autonomous prosecution mechanism has emerged on the international scene. As Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo emphasized, the independence of the prosecutor, whose authority to open investigations is enshrined in article 15 of the Rome Statute, allows the court to operate beyond the control of political actors. However, as the Court enters into a more operational stage, issuing the first arrest warrants and starting judicial procedures, reconciling peace and justice initiatives poses challenges. Mr. Ocampo noted that any peace agreement that is negotiated before the justice process develops must be compatible with the Rome Statute and not compromise on legality and accountability. He expressed his concern about amnesty provisions and



promises of immunity from the court being used as a bargaining tool, underlining that the refusal of blanket amnesties is a legal requirement and not just a policy decision. The activities of Court, especially arrest warrants, should not be seen as a means to bring people to the negotiation table. The positive impact of the ICC, its credibility and thereby deterrent effect are jeopardised, if the perpetrators of crimes remain at large.

NEXT STEPS

There is an urgent need to close the gap between both internationally and nationally proclaimed principles and their implementation and enforcement on the ground.

The UN risks huge potential damage in terms of credibility, if it fails to live up to the responsibility to protect principle. Speakers were confident, however, that problems with the implementation of the RtP are solvable. Efforts should be undertaken for further norm-building as well as the development of existing coercive tools, e.g. the improvement of sanctions enforcement and military doctrine and capacity. In this context, participants called for support for the establishment of a UN Emergency Peace Service, a standing, rapid reaction mechanism of both military and civilian personnel.

It was recommended that the future Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide should have a full-time mandate, and that his/her office be located close to the SG within the UN system. The new SA should engage in “environment creation” within the international community, e.g. by seeking a GA declaration on the prevention of genocide, as well as confidence-building with Member States through diplomacy and cooperation. While Mr. Mendez described the position as a balancing act between the function of an adviser within the UN Secretariat and the role of a rapporteur or a public spokesperson, there was wide agreement that outreach is crucial to the SA’s work, to inform the public, gather information and suggestions, and spearhead scholarship and research on genocide prevention.

Academic or research institutions should maintain a data-base of potential risk situations, or watch list outside the UN, where leaks and diplomatic protests from countries fearing intrusions into their internal affairs are likely. In addition, the creation of a genocide center on the periphery of the UN was advocated that could work closely with the Special Adviser. Such a center could serve to screen and structure information.

One of the key questions during this seminar was how political will can be generated within national and international organizations. It was stressed that the UN, as governments and other organizations, is not monolithic. The task is to find the individuals who care about genocide prevention and to link them together. As Juan Mendez stated: *„In the exercise of my duties I have learned to recognize: 1) that political will to prevent or to punish genocide is never there spontaneously; and 2) that political will is built, step by step, by men and women of good will who are ready to engage in campaigning against genocide.“*

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Ms. Canan Gündüz, Peacebuilding Issues Programme, International Alert

Dr. David Hamburg, Chair, UN Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention, former Co-Chair, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (CCPDC)

Ms. Jane Holl Lute, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO

Ms. Heidi Hulan, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, former Deputy-Director, ICISS Secretariat

Ambassador Abdelrahim A. Khalil, Director, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Ms. Susan Koscis, Director of Communications, Search for Common Ground

Mr. Juan Méndez, President, International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and former Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

Ms. Simone Monasebian, Chief, UNODC New York Office, former Principal Defender of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and Trial Attorney in the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR

Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (ICC)

Mr. John Packer, Coordinator, Initiative on Conflict Prevention through Quiet Diplomacy, Human Rights Internet, and former Director of the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities

Dr. Connie Peck, Senior Fellow, Programme in Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy, UNITAR

Dr. Bertrand Ramcharan, former High Commissioner for Human Rights

Ms. Loraine Rickard-Martin, Senior Political Affairs Officer Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch, Security Council Affairs Division, DPA

Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, James Farmer Professor in Human Rights, University of Mary Washington; founder and president of Genocide Watch; Vice President, International Association of Genocide Scholars

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